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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ______________________________ 
 
 
 
WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge.   
 
  In a bench trial, the district court found that the 
plaintiff-appellant, Jackie L. Wilson, had failed to sustain her 
burden of proof in demonstrating she was discriminated against 
because of her gender by the defendants-appellees, Susquehanna 
Township Police Department and Susquehanna Township Board of 
Commissioners.  Ms. Wilson alleged she was wrongfully denied a 
new position, title, and job responsibilities in the police 
department in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.1  
Ms. Wilson appeals. 
  In its Memorandum Opinion of August 15, 1994, the 
district court, in spite of its ruling adverse to Ms. Wilson, 
expressed amazement at the evidence adduced at trial detailing 
the sexually charged atmosphere existing in the police 
                     
1
.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 
U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. 
 
 
  
department.  In their brief, even the appellees concede "that the 
environment at the Susquehanna Township Police Department was 
from time to time bawdy and crude."  We, too, are appalled that 
this extremely offensive sexual environment was permitted to 
exist in any workplace, but particularly in a vital public 
office.  That, however, does not end our analysis. 
  Ms. Wilson, a civilian employee, was first hired by the 
police department in 1980 as a clerk typist, and in 1990, was  
promoted to a secretarial position with a pay increase.  In 1991, 
the police department acquired a new record keeping computer 
system.  Ms. Wilson and Officer Donald Smith each did some of the 
preliminary work in selecting the particular computer system and 
in its installation and utilization.  An outside computer 
consultant recommended that a Records System Supervisor position 
be created to oversee use of this new system.  It was known that 
both Ms. Wilson and Officer Smith were interested in this new 
position.  The choice between them was up to Chief Thomas Bell. 
  Chief Bell was first employed by the department in 1969 
and became chief in 1988.  He was the supervisor of both Ms. 
Wilson and Officer Smith.  The problem arises because of Chief 
Bell's selection of Officer Smith against the background of the 
sexual environment in the police department and other evidence of 
gender bias.  This is not a situation where Chief Bell did not 
know about the offensive atmosphere in his department.  He, in 
fact, was part of the problem. 
  No fault is found with the qualifications of Officer 
Smith.  The record shows he was a college graduate, had taken 
  
computer courses in high school and attended computer seminars.  
Ms. Wilson had previous experience with computers in the 
department.  She was not a college graduate, but had taken 
college courses and was pursuing a degree in Integrated 
Information Systems Management.  Ms. Wilson was thoroughly 
familiar with department record keeping whereas Officer Smith's 
previous duties had involved traffic safety. 
  The sexual harassment of women mentioned by the 
district court is detailed and undisputed in the record.  We need 
only summarize, not detail, that evidence to reveal its extreme 
offensiveness.  Among other things, the evidence showed the 
circulation on a daily basis of sexually explicit drawings, and 
the posting of obscene notices, some referring to female 
employees by name.  Sexual conversations with female employees 
accompanied by leering were common place.  A professional x-rated 
movie was shown, as well as graphic home videos.  The female 
employees were called to the break room by officers to join them 
in viewing these pornographic films.  The Chief talked about the 
sex life of some of the officers as well as his own, even 
commenting adversely about his own anatomy.  The Chief also made 
other sexual comments offensive to women, if not also to men.  
These comments were about the anatomy of female employees and 
their physiological and sexual differences.  Ms. Wilson testified 
about an indecent assault on her by an officer.  When she 
complained to Chief Bell he laughingly dismissed it.  The 
testimony showed that Chief Bell was fully aware of this 
pervasive sexual misconduct in the department.  There is, 
  
however, other pertinent evidence of gender bias which we will 
set forth later. 
  The district court in applying the law to the facts 
first followed McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973), and found that plaintiff had shown she was a member of a 
protected class.  She was qualified for the position, but 
rejected, and a non-member of the class, Officer Smith, was 
treated more favorably.  The district court held that the 
plaintiff made out a prima facie case of sexual discrimination. 
  The district court next considered whether defendants 
had articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for their 
bypassing of the plaintiff in favor of a non-member of the class, 
and concluded that they had.  The defendants offered three 
explanations.  First, the defendants claimed they wanted a police 
officer who would most likely remain in the new position for a 
long period of time.  The district court promptly disposed of 
that reason as not credible, noting Ms. Wilson had been with the 
department for eleven years and Officer Smith only fifteen 
months.  Second, the defendants claimed that having an officer in 
charge would better fulfill their responsibility in keeping 
department records confidential.  The district court saw this as 
a transparent excuse, finding that Ms. Wilson had had access to 
virtually all department records prior to the installation of the 
new computer system.  The district court also noted that Chief 
Bell testified that the confidential police information is now 
entered into the new computer system, not by police officers, but 
by two civilian employees. 
  
  The defendants' final excuse was that a police officer 
within the police chain of command was preferable to a civilian 
in the new position because an officer would be more accountable 
to the Chief of Police.  This explanation was found by the 
district court to be "more credible," which in view of the two 
other pretextual reasons was not a very high threshold.  The 
district court gave weight to the fact that the discipline of 
civilian employees is the responsibility of the Township Manager, 
not the Police Chief, as it is with police officers.  Chief Bell 
wanted control.  The court found this to be a legitimate 
justification, and therefore, not pretextual.   
  The district court explained that "[o]nce the employer 
had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 
employment action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination."  The 
plaintiff was held not to have met her burden in regard to this 
one remaining reason. 
  Next the district court found, citing St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), and 
assuming arguendo that even had Ms. Wilson demonstrated all 
defendants' excuses to be pretextual, she nevertheless failed to 
carry her burden of persuasion.  In making this determination, 
the district court did not ignore the "inappropriate conduct" in 
the police department, but concluded that Ms. Wilson had not 
proven that the offensive conduct had resulted in discriminatory 
employment actions regarding women.  As a basis for this 
conclusion, the district court credited the fact that three women 
  
police officers had been appointed to special duty assignments, 
assignments also sought by male officers.  That is not disputed 
by Ms. Wilson, but those special duty assignments were not 
supervisory.  It appears that no woman had ever been appointed to 
a supervisory position by Chief Bell.2  Further, at least two of 
these three special assignments to women were made only after Ms. 
Wilson's gender complaint had been filed with the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Commission. 
  The district court gave no weight to the uncontroverted 
comment of Mr. Caughey, the Township Manager, that "if he had to 
pay a woman what a man makes he wouldn't hire any women."  
Another woman employee of the township testified she heard the 
Township Manager say "there would be no woman supervisor if he 
had anything to do with it."  The district court found that 
evidence not to be persuasive because the appointment decision 
was Chief Bell's, not the Township Manager's, and further because 
of the actual assignment of the three women police officers to 
special duty.  The Township Manager did not make the appointment 
technically; Chief Bell did, but as might be expected the record 
reveals that the Township Manager took an active part in 
personnel matters and expressed his discriminatory views.  The 
record, however, does not reveal how much influence the Township 
Manager had over police personnel, but as Township Manager he 
                     
     
2The new position did not involve the supervision of people, 
only computers, although defendants in their brief make the point 
that Ms. Wilson had never had a department supervisory position.  
That is not surprising in view of the evidence concerning the 
department. 
  
likely had some control, if not technically, at least 
practically.  The Township Manager and Chief Bell were of one 
mind concerning the appointment of women to supervisory 
positions.  The record shows that when Ms. Wilson pressed Chief 
Bell for the "real reason" she did not get the promotion, he told 
her that "Miles [Caughey] wanted a man."  In dismissing Caughey's 
animus as not dispositive of the question of Chief Bell's 
pretext, the district court apparently did not consider that by 
offering Caughey's bias as a reason for his (the Chief's) 
decision, the Chief clearly showed that Ms. Wilson's sex played a 
role in his decision, again manifesting his own gender bias 
(amply reflected elsewhere in the record).  This analytic 
omission was most likely a consequence of the court's being 
locked into the McDonnell Douglas framework. 
  We have serious doubts about the related finding by the 
district court that the discipline and control of police 
officers, rather than of civilian employees, was easier for Chief 
Bell.  It was claimed a civilian could be disciplined only by the 
Township Manager.  There was evidence, however, that Chief Bell 
was responsible for assigning all Ms. Wilson's duties and that 
she was accountable only to him.  For instance, Chief Bell was 
the only one who could authorize overtime for Ms. Wilson.  Chief 
Bell had also written Ms. Wilson's prior job descriptions and she 
received her orders and duty assignments from him.  A police 
lieutenant, however, supervised her vacation time.  It does not 
appear that Ms. Wilson ever gave any cause for disciplinary 
concern, except when she took her gender complaint to the 
  
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.  Then at Chief Bell's 
request directed to Mr. Caughey, the Township Manager, Ms. Wilson 
was terminated.  Conversely, it appears Chief Bell did not have 
complete disciplinary control over police officers.  He could 
suspend an officer for up to thirty days, but only the Board of 
Commissioners could demote or terminate a police officer.  It is 
unconvincing that discipline was so vital to Chief Bell in a 
department where discipline seems to have been so seriously 
lacking, particularly in an area as important as sexual 
harassment.  Viewing all of this in context, admittedly from the 
record and not with the benefit of having been the trial judge, 
we have serious doubts about the finding that this remaining 
proffered reason was not as pretextual as the others.  However, 
regardless of that finding, clearly erroneous or not, in our view 
the applicable prevailing law was not applied. 
  We appreciate that this area of the law has not always 
been easy to ascertain or to apply.  Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 
F.3d 586 (3rd Cir. 1995), an en banc decision, is helpful and 
instructive.  Miller, however, came too late to assist the 
district judge in the present case.  Miller is an Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case, not a sex 
discrimination case, but the Miller court makes clear the obvious 
relationship between Title VII's prohibited prejudices and the 
ADEA, which follows Title VII jurisprudence.  Id. at 592.  Miller 
then elaborates upon the distinction between pure "pretextual" 
cases and "mixed motives" cases as enunciated in Price-Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  Id. at 593-94.  In Price- 
  
Waterhouse, it is explained that the familiar rules about the 
burden of production and persuasion found in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Texas Dept. of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 284 (1981), are not to be applied in 
all situations.  A distinction is made between "pretextual" 
cases, like McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, and a "mixed motives" 
case such as Price-Waterhouse.  The "mixed motives" distinction 
drawn in Price-Waterhouse and explained in Miller requires the 
application of different rules: 
  The [Price-Waterhouse] Court held that, in cases where 
  the plaintiff offers "direct evidence" of unlawful  
 discrimination and the evidence as a whole permits a  
 conclusion that both permissible and impermissible  
 considerations played a role in the employer's  
 decision, the plaintiff need only show that the  
 unlawful motive was a substantial motivating factor in  
 that decision.  If the finder of fact concludes that  
 the plaintiff has carried this burden, the burden of  
 persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove that the  
 unlawful motive was not a but-for cause, i.e., that the  
 same action would have been taken, because of  
 legitimate considerations, in the absence of the lawful  
 motive. 
 
Miller, 47 F.3d at 594.   
  The holding in Price-Waterhouse, applicable here, is 
succinctly summed up by the Supreme Court:   
  We hold that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case  
 proves that her gender played a motivating part in an  
 employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding  
 of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the  
 evidence that it would have made the same decision even  
 if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into  
 account. 
 
Price-Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. 
  
  In a case, however, which does not qualify for the 
burden shifting provision of Price-Waterhouse the plaintiff "must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age [sex] played a 
role in the employer's decisionmaking process and that it had a 
determinative effect on the outcome of that process."  Miller, 47 
F.3d at 598.  That is the burden applied by the district court to 
Ms. Wilson, but her burden in a mixed motives case is not that 
heavy. 
  It is of no moment that the plaintiff in the present 
case was found not to have shown that all the defendants' 
proffered reasons were in fact pretext.  Her burden is not so 
exclusively defined.  The district court citing St. Mary's Honor 
Center v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), put all 
the burden of persuasion on Ms. Wilson.  As Miller points out, 
however, St. Mary's is a pretextual and not a mixed motives case.  
Miller, 47 F.3d at 596.   
  In consideration of all the circumstances, we view this 
as clearly a mixed motives case based upon the findings of the 
district court.  The record clearly goes beyond "stray remarks" 
and evinces strong gender bias in the police department, 
including on the part of Chief Bell.  This evidence, which 
included "conduct or statements by persons involved directly 
reflecting the discriminatory attitude," Starceski v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Nos., 94-3182 & -3208, typescript at 9 
(3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted), goes far 
beyond the weaker inference of improper motive raised by the 
plaintiff's prima facie case under the pretext framework and 
  
constitutes "direct evidence" of discriminatory animus, see 
Starceski typescript 9 n.5; Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. 
Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1225 n.6 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. granted & 
judgment vac'd for reconsideration on other grounds, 115 S. Ct. 
1397 (1995).  Based on this evidence, we conclude that Chief 
Bell's bias was a substantial motivating factor in the promotion 
decision and meets the first hurdle required by Price-Waterhouse.  
The district court must, however, further determine whether the 
evidence showed that Chief Bell would have made the same 
promotion decision even in the absence of his improper motive; 
the risk of non-persuasion in that determination would rest with 
Chief Bell.  On this record, the failure to judge this case as a 
mixed motives case is legal error, and the case must be reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings in order to apply the Price-
Waterhouse standard as further explained in Miller. 
 REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 ______________________ 
 
